In matters of personal taste, faultless disagreement occurs between people who disagree over what is tasty, fun, etc., in those cases when each of these people seems equally far from the objective truth. Faultless disagreement is often taken as evidence that truth is relative. This article aims to help us avoid the truth-relativist conclusion. The article, however, does not argue directly against relativism; instead, the article defends non-relative truth constructively, aiming to explain faultless disagreement with the resources of semantic contextualism. To this end the article describes and advocates a contextualist solution inspired by supervaluationist truth-value gap approaches. The solution presented here, however, does not require truth value gaps; it preserves both logical bivalence and nonrelative truth, even while it acknowledges and explains the possibility of faultless disagreement. The solution is motivated by the correlation between assertions' being true and their being useful. This correlation, furthermore, is used not only to tell which assertions are true, but also to determine which linguistic intuitions are reliable.
Introduction
Bittersweet chocolate is tasty to some but not to others, and none seem able to justify their preferences with objective reasons. Since the Greek Sophists and perhaps before, many have invoked the relativity of personal taste in order to argue that truth, too, is relative. If it depends on whom you ask whether bittersweet chocolate is tasty-so goes their argument-then it also depends on whom you ask whether it is true that bittersweet chocolate is tasty.
During the last decade, philosophers and linguists have put this argument into a rigorous form that has become quite influential, namely, the Faultless Disagreement Argument for Relativism (FDAR) . This form of the argument originates with Max Kölbel in 2002, and occurs among others in Peter Lasersohn (2005) , Tamina Stephenson (2007) , John MacFarlane (2007; , and Andy Egan (2010) .
Here is what FDAR consists in. Take the sentence type, 'Bittersweet chocolate is tasty. ' Some of us are disposed to utter this sentence type approvingly, while others are disposed to utter and approve its negation, i. e., 'Bittersweet chocolate is not tasty':
(1) Amelie: Bittersweet chocolate is tasty.
Bernoulli: Bittersweet chocolate is not tasty.
If we wish to save truth from relativity even while acknowledging that personal taste is relative, then it might seem, at first, that we can adopt a very simple form of contextualism. According to this simple contextualist solution, we can explicate the truth conditions of Amelie's and Bernoulli's utterances thus:
(2) (Simple Contextualism) Amelie: Bittersweet chocolate is tasty to me.
Bernoulli: Bittersweet chocolate is not tasty to me.
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Notice, however, that in dialog (1) it seems intuitively that Amelie and Bernoulli disagree with each other; in dialog (2), on the other hand, they clearly do not disagree, but simply talk about their different taste standards. If there is genuine disagreement in (1), then the simple contextualist solution (2) is mistaken.
The proponents of FDAR maintain, indeed, that the disagreement in (1) is genuine. Moreover, according to FDAR, no matter how we choose a taste standard σ, Amelie's utterance in (1) cannot have the following truth conditions:
Amelie's utterance is true iff bittersweet chocolate is tasty according to σ, i. e., iff Tasty(bittersweet chocolate, σ).
If the above were true for any choice of σ, then Amelie's utterance would either be objectively true or it would be objectively false, depending whether bittersweet chocolate and σ satisfied the two-place relation Tasty. This means that either Amelie would be objectively right and Bernoulli objectively wrong, or the other way. Yet in (1) it seems that each of the two is 'faultless, ' at least in the minimal sense that neither is any further from the objective truth than the other.
FDAR concludes that the utterances in (1) have the following truth conditions:
Amelie's utterance is true iff bittersweet chocolate is tasty (full stop) Bernoulli's utterance is true iff bittersweet chocolate is not tasty (full stop) There is, presumably, no fact of the matter as to whether bittersweet chocolate is tasty full stop. Hence the above are not simply truth conditions on possible worlds, but rather, they are conditions on pairs of the form ⟨possible world, taste standard⟩.
1 For instance, the pair ⟨actual world, Amelie's tastes⟩ verifies Amelie's utterance and falsifies Bernoulli's, while the pair ⟨actual world, Bernoulli's tastes⟩ verifies Bernoulli's and falsifies Amelie's.
1 Depending on what is at issue, the truth conditions can also be relativized to further parameters: ⟨possible world, taste standard, . . .⟩. In this paper, however, at issue is only personal taste.
So much about truth conditions. As for the propositions that determine such truth conditions, they are, of course, relative propositions, i. e., propositions that are true or false only relative to one taste standard or another. We may construe such propositions, for instance, as sets of ordered pairs ⟨possible world, taste standard⟩.
As is customary, we will call the view I just described relativism. Notice, however, that there is another prominent view often called 'moderate relativism' (e. g., Recanati, 2007) . As applied to personal taste, moderate relativism does not relativize utterance truth to taste standards;
instead, moderate relativism relativizes only the truth of propositions, while allowing utterances' truth conditions to be fixed once and for all by the contexts in which the utterances are made.
I. e., according to moderate relativism the following are true:
1. In (1), Amelie expresses the relative proposition that bittersweet chocolate is tasty (full stop)
2. In (1), the context of Amelie's utterance determines a particular taste standard σ. 3. In (1), Amelie's utterance is true iff Amelie expresses a relative proposition that is true relative to the contextually determined standard, i. e., iff it is true, relative to σ, that bittersweet chocolate is tasty.
As we see, moderate relativism is not the kind of view that we call relativism in this article. Hopefully, this will yield not just another shot in the duel of theories, but a better understanding of the practice of communicating about subjective matters. The latter is a surprisingly consequential problem, and even if relativism is eventually abandoned, it will be its merit to have brought the problem to our attention.
* * *
As we work our way toward our contextualist treatment of faultless disagreement, we will give a prominent role to the connection between truth and usefulness. Truth values have a particular kind of strategically important explanatory power. For illustration consider the following two stories.
First story.
Fred has an old scar that has become infected. The family doctor consults a specialist, who asserts, 'The infection is staphylococcal. ' The family doctor therefore prescribes Oxacillin, which is usually effective against Staphylococcus. The doctors are, indeed, right, and one week later Fred has fully recovered.
Second story. Fred has an old scar that has become infected. The family doctor consults a specialist, who asserts, 'The infection is staphylococcal. ' The family doctor therefore prescribes Oxacillin, which is usually effective against Staphylococcus. In this story, however, the specialist is wrong. Nevertheless, one week later Fred has fully recovered. 'Why?', we ask. As it turns out, the infection was streptococcal, and often Streptococcus too will respond to Oxacillin.
Notice the 'why'-moment during the second story. When we hear the first story, we don't encounter a similar moment. When the diagnosis is true, we are not surprised that Fred recovered. When the diagnosis is false, however, we need an additional explanation; there has to be more to the story. The false diagnosis won't do on its own-it will not contribute to the story In Section 3, therefore, I will develop a bivalent contextualist solution, one on which the gap is not in the truth values, but rather in the verdicts of the context-determined standard σ.
That is, in (1) σ says neither that bittersweet chocolate is tasty, nor that it is not; accordingly, both Amelie and Bernoulli are making equally false assertions. In (5), on the other hand, Cora and Dorian are making true assertions. I will provide a mathematical model for the view in Sections 5 and 6.
As we see, one reason for a DeRose-style solution is that it allows us to save faultless disagreement. There is, however, a further reason-namely, our solution allows us to do justice to the truth-usefulness connection. I will explain why in Section 4.
Finally, in Section 7 I will survey the field of linguistic intuitions that have been marshaled to support relativism and contextualism respectively, and I will investigate which intuitions we should trust, and which it is safe, under circumstances, to doubt.
We will thus be able to explain faultless disagreement while reconciling objective truth with subjective taste, preserving bivalence, and safeguarding the strategic connection between truth and usefulness.
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In dialog (2) we have seen a very simple contextualist paraphrase of dialogs such as (1). That simple contextualism was rejected, both by the relativists and by ourselves, because it 'loses disagreement, ' i. e., it has the interlocutors talking past each other instead of genuinely contradicting one another. As we will see, however, it is not only simple contextualism that loses disagreement. So does relativism, unless it posits significant semantic naivety (or 'semantic blindness'); and if it does the latter, then relativism loses most of the force of the FDAR. Hence Amelie and Bernoulli must be semantically naive; they must be unaware that their disagreement concerns merely a relative proposition. Stojanovic concludes that there is no such thing as faultless disagreement at all. This is because, she maintains, "[s]peakers of English are semantically competent with predicates of taste: they master their meaning and truth conditions" (Stojanovic, 2007:696) .
I concur with Stojanovic that Amelie and Bernoulli cannot disagree genuinely unless they ignore certain aspects of their utterances' truth conditions. This means that FDAR requires a certain amount of semantic naivety. Then, however, FDAR loses a good deal of its force, because once we have semantic naivety on the table, we-contextualists-can invoke it too. That is just what I will do; in matters of personal taste I find semantic naivety rather plausible, as I will explain in Section 4. Accepting semantic naivety will allow us to pursue a version of contextualism that saves faultless disagreement, in the sense that it saves the faultless interlocutors from talking past each other.
That will be the topic of the next three sections.
We want a contextualist theory that allows Amelie and Bernoulli not to talk past each other.
One such theory is the truth-value gap view (DeRose, 2004 (DeRose, , 2009 Let us adopt this supervaluationist aspect of the truth-value gap view. Let us also adopt a further aspect of the view, namely, the following trivial consequence of the quotation/disquotation principles:
(7) (It is true that bittersweet chocolate is tasty by σ) iff (bittersweet chocolate is tasty by σ).
What we will deny, however, is this final aspect of the truth-value gap view:
(8) (It is false that bittersweet chocolate is tasty by σ) iff (bittersweet chocolate is non-tasty by σ).
Instead, we will adopt this equivalence:
) (It is false that bittersweet chocolate is tasty by σ) iff (it is not true that bittersweet chocolate is tasty by σ).
Notice that (9) preserves logical bivalence, whereas (8) would sacrifice it. 4 (9) leaves no gap in the truth values; the gap is now elsewhere, namely, in the verdicts of the standard σ. By this standard, bittersweet chocolate is not tasty, but it is not non-tasty either. Rather, on the matter of bittersweet chocolate, σ is silent:
It is false that by standard σ bittersweet chocolate is tasty.
It is false that by standard σ bittersweet chocolate is non-tasty.
It is true that it is not the case that by standard σ bittersweet chocolate is tasty.
It is true that it is not the case that by standard σ bittersweet chocolate is non-tasty. John: Well, the merry-go-round was fun, but the water slide was a little too scary. (Lasersohn, 2005:674) In this case, John says the truth iff the merry-go-round was fun for Bill; it doesn't matter whether it was fun for the interlocutors, Mary and John.
4 Taste, Truth, and Usefulness
Reasons, Pulling and Pushing
To support a claim we can give two kinds of reasons, which we will distinguish as 'pushing' and 'pulling. ' A pulling reason is a matter of what the claim can do for us. For instance, if the claim that p helps us explain or predict phenomena, then these are pulling reasons to believe that p.
On the other hand, a pushing reason is one that allows us to see why the claim is true. A proof that p, for instance, is a reason that pushes us to accept that p; so does a scientific prediction that p (as opposed to a confirmed prediction based on p, which is not pushing but pulling).
Here is an illustration. If we adopt the law of gravitation because it predicts planetary orbits or projectile trajectories, then these are pulling reasons. On the other hand, if we adopted it because it followed from generalized relativity, which we had already accepted for independent reasons, then we would adopt it for pushing reasons. (Furthermore, if we adopt generalized relativity because it can explain gravitation, then this is a pulling reason.)
Let us now look at the reasons that support the key aspect we have adopted from DeRose's truth-value gap view, namely (6): 
Taste and Usefulness
Since faultless disagreement appears to require semantic naivety, we need to look at the conditions under which taste assertions can be semantically naive, but still (normally) useful. As I will First, let us imagine a case very similar to John Perry's Z-land (1986) . Z-land is a small island whose inhabitants are unaware that there are more lands than Z-land in the world. This is why Z-landers don't treat weather reports as location-dependent. To them, it is not sunny-in-Z-land; it is simply sunny full stop. Picture, now, a community whose members all share exactly the same tastes, hence never come to realize that tastiness can vary with personal standards.
Rather, they believe that tastiness is an objective property of certain external objects. One day Zeus says to Zoe:
Zeus: This salad is tasty.
Then Zoe, who trusts Zeus, will eat the salad, and since she shares the same tastes as Zeus and everyone else, she will enjoy it. For Zeus and Zoe and their compatriots, tastes behave just as location does in Z-land, i. e., they make no difference. Even though Zeus and Zoe are unaware that tastiness is at bottom a relation between foods and subjective standards, they can still communicate about tastiness usefully. To be sure, Yeti can still benefit from Yeta's assertion, if he learns from it that Yeta believes that strawberry yogurt is delicious. In her turn, Yeta could then benefit from Yeti's awareness of her tastes. But this is not the kind of usefulness that is relevant to semantics and to truth conditions. Instead, this kind of usefulness is a matter of Gricean, pragmatic reasoning; all assertions can be useful this way, no matter whether they concern taste, planets, or triangles.
Taste and Truth
Semantically naive speakers can make taste assertions just as useful as those made by speakers more sophisticated. Moreover, even when otherwise sophisticated speakers become naive, they can still make useful assertions.
Notice, now, that it is not by accident that these naive assertions are useful. They are useful when the interlocutors have similar tastes where it matters, and this tends to happen not sporadically or by chance, but systematically. For instance, members of the same community often share tastes because of their shared background. Customers of the same restaurant often share tastes simply because the restaurant caters to customers with those tastes. Friends and family 5 Notice that this concerns naive assertions. Sophisticated assertions can easily be useful even when the speakers have dissimilar tastes, as for instance, in restaurants with semantically sophisticated waiters and customers.
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have often developed similar tastes through past interaction. Finally, when people exchange advice about food, pop music, or clothing, they often do so because they have already evinced similar tastes in the past. (We tend not to seek advice from sources we think misleading.) In all these ways, people's tastes come to overlap, and therefore when naive taste assertions are useful, they normally don't just happen to be so, but rather they can be expected to be.
Recall, now, that as contextualists we must give a well-motivated answer to the question which taste standards are reflected by naive taste assertions in cases of faultless disagreement.
We can determine these standards if we determine the circumstances under which such assertions are true. Suppose that a naive taste assertion has truth conditions of the following form:
⌜x is predicate-of-taste by standard θ⌝ is true iff x is such-and-such
Then θ is the standard that every x meets iff x meets the condition such-and-such. If we can put such-and-such in terms independent of θ, then we can answer our question.
The question about taste standards thus boils down to a question about truth. Truth, in turn, is connected to usefulness; to wit, assertions are true when they reflect reality so as to contribute (non-accidentally) to the interlocutors' goals. Let us ask, therefore, under what circumstances naive taste assertions are normally, non-accidentally useful. Once we figure this out, we can determine which taste standards naive assertions reflect when they are true.
First, notice that naive taste assertions are seldom useful unless they reflect the tastes of their hearers:
(10) Xenon: The vegetable soup is the tastiest.
If Xenon's assertion does not reflect Xena's tastes then she will not benefit from the advice. If he is trying to help her, he will fail; if hoping to ingratiate himself to her, he will fail; if hoping to receive useful advice in return, he will be less likely to succeed; in the worst case, Xena may retaliate.
We can therefore conclude at least this much: Naive taste assertions can only be expected to be useful in a normal fashion if they reflect the tastes of the hearer.
That, however, is not enough. I maintain that such assertions also need to reflect the tastes of the speaker.
Notice an important distinction. What I am saying is not merely that useful naive taste assertions do reflect the speaker's tastes. They do, of course, but so do useless ones. In general, naive taste assertions reflect the speakers' tastes for the obvious reason that honest speakers say what they think. But it is not enough, for our purposes, to argue that such assertions reflect the speakers' tastes for this obvious reason. Rather, we must argue that it is because they reflect the speakers' tastes that the assertions are useful.
This will not be obvious if we only look at (10) in isolation. However, the great majority of assertions are not one-shot affairs. Rather, they are embedded in the back-and-forth of ongoing linguistic interactions. Assertions have effects, some foreseeable and others less so, on the community's store of beliefs-beliefs that include those of the hearer and those of people who the hearer influences. For illustration take this exchange:
(11) Xenon: Spinach is tasty.
Xena: Spinach is a leafy vegetable, so if it's tasty on its own, it must also be tasty with vinaigrette.
Xenon: Great! Then I'll try it with vinaigrette.
Notice how Xenon's first assertion comes back to him-in this example, quite directly; in real life, in many, less direct ways. If speakers' taste assertions did not reflect the speakers' own preferences, then the assertions' consequences would not feed back toward the speakers' goals, and often they would even accrue against them. Normally, therefore, naive taste assertions will be useful only if they reflect hearer's and speaker's tastes alike. First, people can make taste assertions in order to influence or to persuade. When I was very young, people used to tell me that spinach is tasty because they hoped to convince me to like it.
Does this kind of use affect the truth conditions of taste assertions? I maintain that it doesn't.
The persuasive use is not proprietary to taste assertions-instead, it pertains to assertions in general. For instance, I can try to persuade (not simply to inform) my friends that it's going to rain by saying to them (perhaps with a certain intonation) that it is going to rain. The persuasive use is not a particular, conventional, semantic feature of taste assertions, but rather a general, pragmatic feature of assertion itself.
Persuasive uses are a special case of a more general phenomenon, namely, attitude coordination. People can make taste assertions in order to coordinate their preferences (Marques and García-Carpintero, 2014; Stephenson, 2007; MacFarlane, 2007) . In such cases, the speakers perform at least two speech acts at once. On one hand, they assert that something (x) has a certain taste feature (F) (e. g., that spinach is yucky). On the other hand, they propose to es- Finally, taste assertions can be made for what we may call 'community building. ' People can communicate about their favorite bands, books, or movies, not so much in order to exchange information, but to build mutual sympathy (Egan, 2010:260-61) : 'XYZ is great!-Oh, you like XYZ too?' Notice that community-building uses are not specific to taste assertions, but can occur with any controversial subjects, such as, for instance, climate change. Some people believe either that climate change is not happening, or that it is not caused by human activity, and they can assert these beliefs in order to build mutual sympathy with others who share their views. The community-building use thus pertains to the general pragmatics of assertion, just as the persuasive use, and does not affect the semantics of taste assertions in particular.
A Mathematical Model for the Semantics of Personal Taste
In the previous section we concluded that when naive taste assertions are true, this is because they reflect both interlocutors' standards at once. If a taste standard is a disposition, then let us call the interlocutors' joint dispositions their 'taste neighborhood. ' A taste neighborhood judges as sharply as its component personal standards converge; as the component standards diverge, the neighborhood grows dull and indiscriminating. To make this notion more perspicuous let me describe a simple mathematical model of one particular taste neighborhood. Let us encode Amelie's and Bernoulli's personal taste verdicts as numbers from 1 to 10; let 'really fun' be a 10, 'average' a 5, etc. Then Amelie and Bernoulli's taste neighborhood yields as its verdicts the two-element sets that contain Amelie's and Bernoulli's personal verdicts. For instance, since Amelie gives the skating rink a 10, while Bernoulli, say, only gives it a 6, their neighborhood assigns to the skating rink the verdict-set {6, 10}.
A taste assertion is true iff its predicate rules in the entire set assigned to the subject by the context-determined taste neighborhood. Otherwise, the assertion is false. 8 We can look at it this way: If the predicate rules in the entire set, then the predicate is coarse enough to render the interlocutors' taste differences irrelevant.
Since Amelie gives the skating rink a 10, Bernoulli a 6, and therefore their neighborhood a {6, 10}, it follows that: 4. It is also false to say, as Bernoulli does, 'It's OK, but it's not really fun. ' 'OK' encodes as the singleton interval [6, 6] , and this fails to rule in the neighborhoods' set {6, 10}.
8 To simplify the exposition, I am assuming that the asserted sentence has the form ⌜subject is taste-predicate.⌝ The model is easily generalized to arbitrary sentence forms. 9 Recall that the interval [a, b] is the set of all real numbers
In dialog (12), therefore, both Amelie and Bernoulli make false assertions. This is only possible if their assertions are not contradictory but only contrary, i. e., if they can be false at once, but cannot be true at once. That is indeed the case:
Amelie's assertion is true iff Amelie and Bernoulli's taste neighborhood rates the skating rink as a subset of [10, 10] ; otherwise Amelie's assertion is false.
Bernoulli's assertion is true iff Amelie and Bernoulli's taste neighborhood rates the skating rink as a subset of [6, 6] ; otherwise Bernoulli's assertion is false. Dorian's assertion is true iff Cora and Dorian's taste neighborhood rates ⟨dark chocolate, milk chocolate⟩ as a subset of the area above the angle bisector; 11 otherwise Dorian's assertion is false.
Comparisons

Reliable and Misleading Intuitions
In the literature on relativism, contextualism, and faultless disagreement, intuitions of several kinds are invoked to support one view or another. As John MacFarlane (2011) and Robin
McKenna (2014) As I have just argued, we should trust speakers' truth-value intuitions when their intuitions are reliable guides to usefulness for the speakers, and we should trust hearers' truthvalue intuitions when their intuitions are reliable guides to usefulness for the hearers. Often this comes down to the same, but in faultless disagreement cases, only hearers' intuitions are reliable guides to usefulness. It is useful for Bernardo-the-hearer to find Amanda's assertion false, because this way he avoids eating tomato yogurt, which would displease his palate. It is also useful for Amanda-the-hearer to find Bernardo's reply false, because this way she will stick to her plans and eat tomato yogurt, which she will enjoy. It is not useful, however, for Amanda-the-speaker to find her own assertion true (unless something unusual is going on), because this truth intuition leads her to tell Bernardo that tomato yogurt is tasty, and this will either be disbelieved by Bernardo, or lead him astray. For the same reasons, it is useless for Bernardo-the-speaker to find his own assertion true.
Hence in faultless disagreement cases hearers have reliable truth-value intuitions, while speakers do not. Assertions made in such cases are therefore false, because this is what the hearers intuit. This accords with our conclusions in Section 4.
(Notice that I am not saying that it is useless for Amanda to believe that tomato yogurt is tasty. Nor am I saying that it is useless for Amanda to intuit that her belief is true; what is useless is for Amanda to intuit that her assertion toward Bernardo is true. Plausibly enough, the belief and the assertion have different truth conditions.)
So much about truth-value intuitions. As for truth-conditional intuitions, I maintain that D R A F T we should generally trust them, both from speakers and especially from hearers. When hearers accept assertions, the assertions inform not only the hearers' actions, but also their inferences.
Inferences, however, are sensitive not just to truth values but also to intensions, and thus to truth conditions. Therefore, in situations where hearers normally make correct inferences, their truth-conditional intuitions are reliable.
At first, what I just conceded looks like an objection to semantic naivety. As long as we trust ordinary speakers' truth-conditional intuitions, we cannot pretend that they are oblivious to certain aspects of the truth conditions. That, however, is just what I maintain in cases of faultless disagreement.
In such cases, however, we have a defeater for the general trustworthiness of truth-conditional intuitions. For the many reasons we have surveyed, when people converse about personal taste, they tend to have similar tastes. When this is so, the interlocutors' semantic mistakes 'cancel out' during inference, the same way as mistakes sometimes cancel out during mathematical derivations. Consider:
Amanda: The lemon frozen yogurt at this place is tasty.
Bernardo: Lemon frozen yogurt is always tastier with mint.
Amanda: Then we should get lemon frozen yogurt and ask for mint on top! Even if the two are unaware that their assertions' truth conditions involve their taste neighborhood, this will affect neither the validity of their reasoning, nor the usefulness of their actions:
Amanda: [According to our taste neighborhood,] the lemon frozen yogurt at this place is tasty. 
Conclusion
I have described and motivated a contextualist solution to the puzzle of faultless disagreement about personal taste. This solution avoids truth relativism, preserves logical bivalence, and still allows us to explain why people arguing about taste seem equally remote from the objective truth.
As a welcome side effect, we have explicated the distinction between what we called 'pulling' and 'pushing' reasons for adopting a theory. We have cast the truth-usefulness connection as a pushing reason for our solution, and we have used the same connection to evaluate the reliability of the linguistic intuitions relevant to the explanation of faultless disagreement. 
